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I.  Introduction
The modern Internet enables “millions of people to communicate with one another and to access vast
amounts of information from around the world.”1  Due to the enormous repository of information the Internet
makes available online, some have compared the Internet to an immense “library with no card catalog.”2
While web users can generally access web sites directly with a domain name, the sheer size of the Internet
makes it difficult for the average web surfer to locate the majority of web sites unless they know the web site
address beforehand.3
Specific web sites and information can be difficult to locate, making Internet search engines crucial to
web user accessibility and manageability.  The size of the Internet and the web-surfing community, coupled
with its increasing importance as a tool of modern commerce and a staple of modern life, creates fierce
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1 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997).
2 F. Gregory Lastowka, Search Engines Under Siege: Do Paid Placement Listings Infringe Trademarks?,14 NO. 7 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 1, 1 (2002).
3 F. Gregory Lastowka, Note, Search Engines, HTML, and Trademarks: What’s the Meta For?, 86 VA. L. REV. 835,
835 (2000) (noting that “in practice the majority of Web sites get less attention than trees falling soundlessly in a
primordial forest”).
2competition for Internet traffic among web sites.4  This motivates web site creators to engage in “search engine
baiting” to maximize their positioning with major search engines and drive Internet traffic to their web
address.5  This also creates a financial incentive for search engines to abandon the traditionally “objective”
ranking of search results in favor of one that is increasingly dominated by commercial interests.6
This Article examines the trademark implications of commonly used approaches to manipulating
search engine placement (and accompanying web traffic) on the Internet.  Part II of this Article reviews the
traditional laws that protect trademark owners and consumers from trademark infringement.7  Part III discusses
the relevant technology of the Internet and the workings of search engines in indexing Internet-based data.8
Finally, Part IV discusses the implications of commonly utilized techniques to improve web site placement and
drive web traffic.9
II. Trademark Protection Under the Lanham Act
The Lanham Act defines and delineates a trademark owner’s federal rights and provides the law
governing trademark disputes.10  Under the Lanham Act, a trademark is defined as a “word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof” used by a maker or seller of goods to identify and distinguish their goods
from those made or sold by others.11  The Lanham Act offers a trademark owner three major causes of action
                                                           
4 See Leonard T. Nuara & Howard P. Benard, How Commerce Becomes E-Commerce, in STRATEGIES FOR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE NEW E-COMMERCE ECONOMY at 475, 491 (Practising Law Institute, Corporate Law
and Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1156, 1999) (noting “the competition for Internet traffic is fierce”);
Katherine E. Gasparek, Comment, Applying the Fair Use Defense in Traditional Trademark Infringement and
Dilution Cases to Internet Meta Tagging or Linking Cases, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 787 (1999) (noting “[c]ountless
numbers of people are making a living off the Internet. . . .”).
5 See Scott Shipman, Comment, Trademark and Unfair Competition in Cyberspace: Can These Laws Deter
“Baiting” Practices on Web Sites?, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 245, 245-46 (1998) (describing methods employed by
webmasters to “bait” search engines and increase site traffic).
6 Brookfield Commc’ns., Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted)
(“With the Web becoming an important mechanism for commerce, companies are racing to stake out their place in
cyberspace.”).
7 For a discussion of the laws of trademark protection under the Lanham Act, see infra notes 10-32 and
accompanying text.
8 For a discussion of the trademark implications of various search engine manipulation techniques, see infra notes
33-62 and accompanying text.
9 For a discussion of Internet and search engine technology, see infra notes 63-110 and accompanying text.
10 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (2000).
11 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000) (defining trademark).  Trademarks are different from service marks.  While trademarks
are used to identify and distinguish goods, a service mark is used to identify and distinguish one person’s services
from the services of others.  Id.  Since the legal requirement for trademarks and service marks are generally the
same, for the purpose of this article, both service marks and trademarks will be collectively referred to as
“trademarks.”
3to protect their trademark rights: (1) trademark infringement, (2) unfair competition, and (3) dilution.12  This
article focuses on the protections against trademark infringement arising from use of trademarks to manipulate
search engine results.
A. Trademark Infringement
Section 32 of the Lanham Act prohibits the use in commerce of “any reproduction, counterfeit, copy,
or colorable imitation” of a registered trademark where “such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive.”13  The public policy rationale that underpins trademark protection, however, has little
to do with the rights of the owner of that trademark.14  Trademark infringement claims are designed to protect
the consumer, not the owner, from possible confusion arising from trademark misuse.15
Where the underlying products are different, determining the likelihood of consumer confusion is a
complex, fact-intensive exercise for the court in a trademark infringement case.16  In Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad
Elecs. Corp.,17 the Second Circuit outlined an indicative listing of the types of factors examined in trademark
infringement cases:
[T]he strength of [the plaintiff’s] mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the
proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual
confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality
of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of buyers.  Even this extensive catalogue does
not exhaust the possibilities--the court may have to take still other variables into account.18
Historically, trademark infringement claims have been designed to protect purchasers of goods from
confusion about the source of those goods.19  Today, the catalog of rights protected by trademark infringement
is much broader.  Currently, trademark infringement is used to provide protection against “confusion as to
                                                           
12 See Gregory Shea, Trademarks and Keyword Banner Advertising, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 529, 534 (2002) (noting
causes of action under the Lanham Act).
13 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2000) (defining trademark infringement).
14 See Shea, supra note 3, at 535 (“The key policy behind protecting trademarks is the protection of consumers.”).
15 See Matthew A Kaminer, The Limitations of Trademark Law in Addressing Trademark Keyword Banners, 16
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 35, 47 (1999) (noting the required “likelihood of confusion” element in
trademark infringement); The right at issue in trademark law is not the ownership rights of the trademark owner, but
protecting the consuming public from “confusion, concomitantly protecting the trademark owner’s right to a non-
confused public.” Shea, supra note 12, at 535-36.
16 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d. Cir. 1961) (noting that trademark infringement “is
a function of many variables.”).
17 287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
18 Id. at 495.
19 See Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The core element of trademark
infringement is the likelihood of confusion, i.e., the similarity of the marks is likely to confuse customers about the
source of the products.”) (quoting E.&J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992)).
4source, but also as to affiliation, connection or sponsorship.”20  The basic elements of an infringement claim
require a plaintiff to prove that “(1) their mark is valid; (2) the mark is owned by the plaintiff; and (3) the
defendant’s use of the mark is likely to cause confusion among the target customer base.”21
B. Initial Interest Confusion
The most common type of confusion protected by trademark infringement is confusion at the point of
sale.22  Some courts, however, have extended infringement protection even further to offer pre-sale
protections.23  The theory of initial interest confusion, which has been used in some jurisdictions, offers
trademark protection to defend against initial confusion caused by an infringing mark when that confusion
leads a buyer to become interested in a product.  This theory applies even if the initial confusion has dissipated
by the time of the actual purchase.24
The practice of Initial Interest Confusion is akin to a “bait and switch” tactic, where consumers are
initially drawn to a product by a deceptive mark, only to discover another product offered in lieu of what they
initially expected.25  In a landmark case for initial interest confusion, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum
Corp.,26 the Second Circuit applied this expansive theory to find actionable trademark injury in cases where no
sale was completed as a result of the trademark confusion.27  In Mobil Oil, Mobil sued an oil trading company
named Pegasus Petroleum for infringing on Mobil’s trademarked “flying horse” symbol that represented the
Greek mythological horse Pegasus.28  The Mobil Oil court based their finding of infringement on the grounds
                                                           
20 Shea, supra note 12 at 537; See also Lindy Pen Co.  v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting
trademark infringement protection “embrac[es] confusion as to the association of the goods or sponsorship of the
allegedly infringing goods.”).
21 Veronica Tucci, The Case of the Invisible Infringer: Metatags, Trademark Infringement and False Designation of
Origin, 5 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2, 28 (2000).
22 See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:5 (4th ed. 2005).
23 Since 1975, some courts have begun to recognize a theory of initial interest confusion, which extends trademark
protection beyond the point-of-sale to provide a form of pre-sale confusion as a cause of action under trademark law.
See Note, Confusion in Cyberspace: Defending and Recalibrating the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2392-93 (2004) (tracing origin of initial interest confusion to Grotrian v. Steinway & Sons,
523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975)).  For a discussion of initial interest confusion theory, see infra notes 24-32 and
accompanying text.
24 Id. (citations omitted).
25 BEVERLY W. PATTISHALL, DAVID C. HILLIARD & JOSEPH N. WELCH II, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
DESKBOOK § 5.05[7] (2003).
26 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987).
27 Id. at 259 (noting the “numerous evils” protected against by trademark protection).
28 Id. at 256 (describing facts of case).  Pegasus Petroleum never used a flying horse symbol in their oil trading
business, only using the name “Pegasus.”  Id.  Mobil made extensive use of flying horse image in connection with
their consumer petroleum business, but did not use it in their commercial oil trading business.  Id. The court found
5that confusion between Mobil’s trademark and Pegasus Petroleum’s name could allow Pegasus to “gain
crucial credibility during the initial phases of a deal.”29  Though some petroleum purchasers could have
discovered that Pegasus and Mobil Oil were not related prior to engaging in any sale, it was possible that initial
confusion between the two marks may have misled an oil trader to believe that Pegasus and Mobil were
related.  This confusion gave Pegasus unjust credibility and created sufficient damages under the Lanham
Act.30
Legal commentators remain divided on whether this doctrine goes too far in protecting a trademark
owner’s rights under the Lanham Act.31  Although not universally accepted, this doctrine is generally used to
enforce a trademark owner’s rights--including disputes arising from trademark use by Internet search
engines.32  Given the Internet’s navigability, as well as the legitimate expectations of web users, this doctrine is
particularly well adapted to protecting the rights of trademark owners in cyberspace.
                                                                                                                                                                                             
sufficient similarity in commercial oil traders’ minds between the strong image of the flying horse used by Mobil in
their consumer business and the name Pegasus to create confusion about the identities of the two companies (noting
lower court finding that there is sufficient likelihood of confusion to grant Mobil relief under the Lanham Act).  Id.
29 Id. at 259.  The court found that the potential for initial confusion that Pegasus Petroleum was affiliated with
Mobil gave Pegasus a crucial advantage.  Id.  “For example, an oil trader might listen to a cold phone call from
Pegasus Petroleum--an admittedly oft used procedure in the oil trading business--when otherwise he might not,
because of the possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related to Mobil.”  Id.
30 Id. (noting the probability that purchasers might be misled into initial confusion works sufficient trademark
injury).  The fact that Pegasus, like all unknown companies in the oil trading business, would be required to post a
letter of credit as security during any oil trading deal, but Mobil would not, proved to the Court that no actual
confusion between the firms existed.  Id.
31 See, e.g., Michael McLoughlin, Note, Trademark Identity in Cyberspace: The Impact of Brookfield
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 20 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 595, 629 (2001) (calling initial
interest confusion doctrine is unwarranted); Ira S. Nathenson, Internet Infoglut and Invisible Ink: Spamdexing
Search Engines with Meta Tags, 12 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 43, 114 (1998) (calling initial interest confusion “a weak
hook on which to sustain trademark infringement”); Michael R. Sees, Notes & Comments, Use of Another’s
Trademark in a Web Page Meta Tag: Why Liability Should Not Ensue Under the Lanham Act for Trademark
Infringement, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 99, 112 (1998) (“[T]he mere possibility of confusing the general public is
not sufficient to establish liability under the Lanham Act.”).  Cf. Rachel Jane Posner, Manipulative Metatagging,
Search Engine Baiting, and Initial Interest Confusion, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 439, 443-44 (2000) (arguing
“that trademark infringement, via initial interest confusion, offers the best doctrinal solution . . .”).
32 The theory of initial interest confusion has been found actionable by the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth
Circuits.  See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding initial
interest confusion “works a sufficient trademark injury” even when no sale is completed as a result of the
confusion); Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 292 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding
“initial interest confusion is actionable under the Lanham Act.”); Elvis Presley Enters. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 204
(5th Cir. 1998) (finding initial interest confusion sufficient to sustain trademark infringement claim); Forum Corp. v.
Forum, Ltd., 903 F.2d 434, 442 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990) (“the fact that confusion as to the source of a product or service
is eventually dispelled does not eliminate the trademark infringement which has already occurred.”); Dr. Seuss
Enters, L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding infringement where
6III. Internet Technology and Search Engines
The Internet has been aptly called “the world’s largest repository of content.”33  The search
engine is what makes the billions of pages of web-based information accessible to the average web user.34
                                                                                                                                                                                             
confusion captured initial consumer attention, even though no actual sale is finally completed as a result of the
confusion).   The Federal and First Circuit has expressly rejected initial interest confusion, finding it insufficient to
create actionable likelihood of confusion.  See, e.g., Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718
F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding temporary confusion insufficient to support a likelihood of confusion
under Lanham Act), Weiss Assocs. v. HRL Assocs., 902 F.2d 1546, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (declining to use initial
interest confusion doctrine).  The Seventh and Ninth Circuit have expressly applied this doctrine to Internet cases.
See Eli Lilly v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding likelihood of confusion based on
initial interest confusion due to defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark in metatags); Interstellar Starship Servs. v. Epix,
Inc., 184 F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th  Cir. 1999) (finding initial interest confusion based on domain name).
33 David M. Fritch, Click Here for Lawsuit – Trespass to Chattels in Cyberspace, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 31, 32
(2004); See also About.com, Search 101 – A Beginner’s Guide to Web Search, http://websearch.about.com/
library/weekly/bl-search101.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2005) (noting overwhelming amount of information available
on Internet).
34 See Brian Morrisey, Search Guiding More Web Activity, CLICKZ INTERNET ADVERTISING NEWS, at
http://www.clickz.com/news/print/php/2108921 (Mar. 12, 2003) (noting importance of Internet search engines).
According to a recent study, the Internet is rapidly becoming the primary means by which many people get key
information:
• When asked where they will go for information the next time they need information about
government or a service it provides, 58% of Internet users say they will go online next time
they need government information; this compares will [sic] 28% who say they will use the
telephone. When all Americans are asked this, 39% of all American say they will go online.
This is about the same share (37%) that says they will call.
• When asked where they will go for information the next time they need health or medical
information, Internet users are about as likely to say they will turn to the Internet for
information as they are to contact a medical professional; 46% say they will find health care
information online next time they need it and 47% say they will contact a medical
professional. Overall, 31% of all Americans say they will find it online, while 59% say they
will contact a medical professional
For business, it is clear that an online presence is important, regardless of whether a business
actually sells its wares over the Internet. If a store provides product information online, even if it
doesn’t sell products at its Web site, nearly half of all Americans (46%) said this would make
them more likely to go to the physical store to buy the product.  About the same number (45%)
said it would make no difference, and these numbers were the same for Internet users and non-
users alike.
John B. Horrigan & Lee Rainie, Counting on the Internet, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, (Dec. 29,
2002) pp 3-4 available at http://www.pewinternet.org/ pdfs/PIP_Expectations.pdf.
7Search engines now represent a significant portion of overall web activity, with an average of over 600
million web searches conducted each day.35 As the importance of the Internet and the search engines that
help users in finding critical information buried within the Internet’s seemingly endless volumes of data
continues to grow, the manipulation of web users’ searches by web site owners and search engines has
become an emerging battleground for protecting trademarked assets.36
A. HTML and Metatag Information
Web pages are written in a programming language called hypertext markup language (“HTML”).37
This HTML code is read and interpreted by a computer’s web browser to create the image, or web page, as
viewed by the web site visitor.38 Identifiers known as metatags, which communicate information about the site,
can be embedded into this HTML source code.39  Because they are a part of the source code, the metatags
                                                           
35 See Rita Vine, The Business of Search Engines: Understanding How Web Advertising, Partnerships, and the Race
for Market Dominance Affect Search Tools and Search Results, INFORMATION OUTLOOK, 5, February 1, 2004,
available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/ mi_mOFWE/is_2_8/ai_114010257, (last visited October 5,
2005) (noting volume of searches conducted over the web).  The Second Circuit provided an operative definition of
a search engine as:
A search engine will find all web pages on the Internet with a particular word or phrase.  Given the
current state of search engine technology, that search will often produce a list of hundreds of web
sites through which the user must sort in order to find what he or she is looking for.
Sporty’s Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsman’s Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000).
36 Movado Group, Inc. v. Matagorda Ventures, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18196, *14 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (With the
growing importance of the Internet in commerce, “there is a growing body of case law regarding liability for
diverting potential customers to one’s website and for using another’s trademark in one’s metatags.” (citations
omitted).
37 Internet.com, W_BOP_DIA, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/H/ HTML.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
38 CNet.com, GLOSSARY, at http://www.cnet.com/Resources/Info/Glossary/ Terms/html.html (last visited Oct. 5,
2005).
As its name suggests, HTML is a collection of formatting commands that create hypertext
documents--Web pages, to be exact. When you point your Web browser to a URL, the browser
interprets the HTML commands embedded in the page and uses them to format the page's text and
graphic elements. HTML commands cover many types of text formatting (bold and italic text,
lists, headline fonts in various sizes, and so on), and also have the ability to include graphics and
other nontext elements.
Id.
39 Kirsten M. Beystehner, Note, See Ya Later, Gator: Assessing Whether Placing Pop-Up Advertising on Another
Company’s Website Violates Trademark Law, 11 INTELL. PROP. L. 87, 93 (2003).
Perhaps due to the pressure of establishing profitable sites, some commercial website owners have
endeavored to exploit the functioning of search engines to make their websites more popular or
visible through use of a technique known as “metatagging.”  In particular, the website owner
8themselves are invisible to the average web site visitor.40 These metatags are, however, often used by Internet
search engines to index and rank web sites.41 While these metatags can contain various types of information,
the two most important types that are relevant for trademark analysis are the “keyword” and “description”
tags.42
A keyword metatag identifies lists of terms which search engines then associate with a particular page
or site.43 Typically, developers will include both generic and specific terms in these keyword metatags so as to
capture the attention of both search engines and web site visitors.44 A description metatag usually contains a
summary of the page or site’s contents.45 Search engines will often display this summary when the web site is
returned as a search result, while some Internet web browsers display it at the top of the “browser window.”46
B. Internet Search Engines
The continued growth of the Internet, as well as the ever-growing online user base, makes major
search engines vital directors of World Wide Web traffic.47 Most users, however, only look at a small
                                                                                                                                                                                             
places frequently searched terms, which may be generic or even popular trademarked names, into
the underlying programming code, or metatags, of its web pages.
Id.
40 Id. at 94 (“[M]etatags have no noticeable effect on the appearance or text of the web pages visible to the Internet
user”).
41 Id. at 94-95 (“T]he repetition and content of metatags can ‘weight’ a website’s value within search engine
databases, thereby increasing the probability that a search engine will produce the site on its list . . . ”).  See also
Movado Group, Inc. v. Matagorda Ventures, Inc., No. 98 Civ. 6223 (LMM) (S.D.N.Y. December 11, 2000) (“When
individuals search for information on the [I]nternet, searching programs look in a website’s metatags to determine if
that website contains content responsive to the search.  The more words in the metatags that overlap words in the
search request, the more likely the website will appear as a ‘match.’”) (citing Brookfield Commc’ns v. W. Coast
Entm’t Corp. 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999)).
42 See Shannon King, Initial Interest Confusion: Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment
Corp., 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 313, 314-15 (2000) (describing forms of metatag keywords).
43 Internet.com, W_BOP_DIA, available at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/K/keyword.html (last visited October
6, 2005).
44 See generally A PROMOTION GUIDE, Keyword Optimization, available at
http://www.apromotionguide.com/keywords.html (last visited October 6, 2005) (noting importance of selecting
proper keywords for search engine optimization).
45 See generally CyberFace Web Site Design, available at http://www.web-site-design.co.za/meta_tags.html (last
visited Oct. 6, 2005).
46 See generally id. (defining different types of metatags).
47 As one court noted, “the Web is notoriously difficult to navigate,” which creates a need for users to rely on search
engines to locate web content.  Novak v. Overture Servs., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 446, 449 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).  One
study estimated that 13% of all web traffic is directed to web sites via search engines.  Brian Morrisey, Search
Guiding More Web Activity, CLICKZ NETWORK, Mar. 12, 2003, http://www.clickz.com/news/print/php/2108921.
9number of prioritized search results returned by a search engine.48 This makes getting priority placement
on that search engine’s results page critical to generating traffic for a web site, thereby making this
positioning highly competitive.49
With the importance placed on finding and presenting relevant web sites in response to a user’s
query, most search engines use automated “spiders” or “robots” that search the web and collect key
information from the sites they visit.50 This information is compiled and matched to a user’s queries by a
search engine’s specific and proprietary algorithms. The algorithms weigh a variety of factors to deliver
and “rank” search engine results in response to a user’s query.51
                                                                                                                                                                                             
For electronic commerce sites, search engines are even more important, with between 8-10% of all e-commerce
referrals coming from search engines.  Id.  The search engine marketplace, while highly competitive, remains
concentrated in a few key search companies.  As of May, 2004, Google, Yahoo! and MSN Search, the top three
search websites, accounted for 86.7% of global search engine usage.  See Robyn Greenspan, Google Gains Overall,
Competition Builds Niches, CLICKZ NETWORK, Jun. 2, 2004,
http://www.clickz.com/stats/big_picture/applications/article.php/3362591.  This market concentration, coupled with
the importance of the search engine for Internet navigation, makes these sites incredibly important “funnels” for web
traffic.  For example, for the week ending May 15, 2004, visits to the top three websites, Google, Yahoo! and MSN,
accounted for 5.5 percent of U.S. Internet visits.  Id.  Search engines, however, do not catalog the entire Internet.
One 1999 study estimated that the top 11 search engines combined, using rough estimates of Internet sizing, covered
only 42% of the Internet.  See Danny Sullivan, Search Engine Coverage Study Published, THE SEARCH ENGINE
REPORT, Aug. 2, 1999, http://searchenginewatch.com/sereport/article/article.php/2207421.  While the top search
engines do not cover all, or even most, of the pages available on the Internet, their importance is largely determined
by how well they cover the most popular sites and prioritize these sites in response to a user’s query.  Id.
48 See Surfers Impatient With Search Engines, BBC NEWS/TECHNOLOGY, June, 27, 2003, at
http://news.bc.co.uk/2/low/technology/3023514.stm.  A 2003 Penn State study found that web surfers typically
review only one page of search engine results, with 19% going on to the second page and fewer than 10% looking at
a third page of results.  Id.
49 See id.  (noting that web surfers typically visit only the first three results from a search engine query). Other
studies show that approximately 70% of users, if they click on a search engine result at all, will click on one of the
first three listings returned from the search engine query.  See Ryan P. Allis, The Importance of Search Engine
Marketing, ZEROMILLION.COM, http://www.zeromillion.com/webmarketing/search-engine-marketing.html (last
visited Oct. 6, 2005).
50 See Wendy Boswell, What Are Search Engine Spiders, Robots, and Crawlers?, ABOUT.COM,
http://websearch.about.com/od/crawlersrobotsspiders/a/spdirs.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2005) (describing search
engine functioning).
51 For example, search engine giant Google uses over 100 factors to determine the order of results it will return in
response to a user’s inquiry.  See Google Information for Webmasters, GOOGLE.COM,
http://www.google.com/webmasters/4.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).  Due to the competitive nature of the search
engine industry and the company’s interest in protecting the integrity of their search results, this is the only
information Google makes publicly available regarding their PageRank algorithm.  Id.
10
The ranking of a web page in a search engine’s results can be, to a limited extent, impacted by the
metatag information a web site developer embeds in the site’s code.52 In an effort to avoid the potential
manipulation of search engine results by site owners, search engines have begun to limit the ability of
web site owners to unilaterally control how their site will rank in search results.53 Most major search
engines limit potential manipulation by a web site owner by minimizing or even eliminating the weight
given to a web site’s keyword metatags when ranking search results.54 Search engines have also made
broader use of external factors outside a site creator’s direct control, such as measuring the number of
links to a particular site, or even looking at rankings across multiple search engine platforms to determine
a web site’s relative ranking in search results.55
                                                           
52 Metatags may offer web site owners some degree of how their web pages are ranked and described by search
engines and can prevent a page from being indexed at all.  See Danny Sullivan, How to Use HTML Meta Tags,
SEARCH ENGINE WATCH, Dec. 5, 2002, http://searchenginewatch.com/webmasters/article.php/2167931.  The degree
of control offered to web site owners, however, varies depending on the search engine.  See id.  Title metatags are
most important, and one of the most important factors in how search engines rank pages.  Id.  Other types of
metatags have different uses to search engines.  Id.  For example, some search engines will use a web site’s meta
description tag as part of the description it returns in listing search results, while others (like Google) will ignore the
meta description tags and generate their own description to display in listings of search results.  Id.
53 Sullivan, supra note 52.  Very few search engines still support use of meta keywords tags.  Id.  The decline in the
use of these tags by search engines is largely an effort by search engines to improve the integrity of search results.
Jill Walen, Can Meta Tags Such as the Keyword Tag Bring High Rankings to my Site?, HIGHRANKINGS.COM at
http://www.highrankings.com/metakeyword.htm (Last modified Nov. 2001) .  These tags were often abused by web
site owners in an effort to usurp search rankings and drive traffic to their sites.  Id.  For example, many pages would
put a popular search term like “sex” repeatedly in their meta tags--even though the site had nothing to do with sex.
Id.  This technique, while deemed poor “netiquette” is also called “keyword stuffing.”  Internet.com, W_BOP_DIA,
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/K/keyword_stuffing.html, (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
There are several methods of keyword stuffing. One way is to insert repeating keywords within the
input type=“hidden” field meta tag or the keyword tag so that the keywords are not seen by the
user but are scanned by the search engine. Another way is to make text in the body of the Web
page invisible text, or hidden text, by making the text the same color as the page’s background,
rendering the text invisible to the user unless the user highlights the text. This method is called
invisible keyword stuffing.
Id.
54 Walen, supra note 53.  Today, much less weight is placed on the meta tags and more weight is placed on actual
page content, links to particular page, etc. in determining a website’s placement on a search engine result listing.  Id.
“To be sure, some engines still do index the words within these meta tags, but it appears that they use them as a
minor supplement to the body copy and the title tags of [a] Web page[ ].”  Id.  See also F. Gregory Lastowka, Search
Engines Under Siege: Do Paid Placement Listings Infringe Trademarks, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. & TECH L.J. 1, 2
(2002) (“Today, however, the majority of search engines claim that they do not recognize keyword metatags.”).
55 Search engines typically index based on variables such as a site’s popularity, the number of links to that site from
other sites, etc., as well as metadata that is included in a web site’s code by the site’s developer.  Some search
engines even conduct broader “metasearches” which compile results based, in part, from the combined databases of
11
Further consolidating the power of search engine companies is the evolving trend of popular
search engines offering “pay for placement” programs.56 A paid placement program allows advertisers to
guarantee a high ranking in search results, usually in response to specific search terms.57 In an effort to
maintain the “integrity” of the search engine, these paid placements are generally segregated on the search
page and clearly labeled to distinguish them from the ordinary search results.58 Placement priority within
these sponsored listings is often determined by auction, with advertisers bidding for placement on specific
terms—giving the first placement to the highest bidder, second to the next highest, and so on.59  Another,
slightly less controversial, variation of this practice is selling keyword-linked banner advertisements on
web sites.60  These banners allow a site owner to pay for a graphical banner ad, or pop-up ad, delivered to
a web user after the user searches for selected keywords.61  As one advertiser commented on modern
                                                                                                                                                                                             
other search engines.  See, e.g., Excite, The Basics of Metasearch, at
http://www.infospace.com/info.xcite/search/help/ aboutmetasearch.htm?ver=12 (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
56 Google earned nearly $1 billion in 2003 from selling advertising for companies on their popular search engine.
See David Vise, Firms Sue Google for Ad Links to Competitors, WASHINGTON POST, at E01, (May 26, 2004),
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/.
57 See Danny Sullivan, Buying Your Way In: Search Engine Advertising Chart, SearchEngineWatch.com, November
22, 2004, http://www.searchenginewatch.com/ webmasters/article.php/2167941 (these are also called “pay for
placement,” “pay for performance,” “CPC listings” (cost-per-click), or “PPC listings” (for pay per click)).
58 Id.  In 2002, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a recommendation to search engine companies to
include “clear and conspicuous disclosures” of sponsored search engine results in response to a deceptive
advertising complaint filed by watchdog group Commercial Alert.  Danny Sullivan, FTC Recommends Disclosure to
Search Engines, SearchEngineWatch.com, July 2, 2002,
http://searchenginewatch.com/sereport/article.php/2164891. The FTC reasoned that:
Because search engines historically displayed search results based on relevancy to the search
query, as determined by algorithms or other objective criteria, . . . consumers may reasonably
expect that the search results displayed by individual search engines are ranked in accordance with
this standard industry practice--that is, based on a set of impartial factors. Thus, a departure from
the standard practice, such as a search engine’s insertion of paid-for placements in the search list,
may need to be disclosed clearly and conspicuously to avoid the potential for deception.
Id. (quoting from FTC’s letter to search engine companies).  To respond to this problem, the FTC recommended:
[I]f your search engine uses paid placement, you make any changes to the presentation of your
paid-ranking search results that would be necessary to clearly delineate them as such, whether they
are segregated from, or inserted into, non-paid listings. Factors to be considered in making such a
disclosure clear and conspicuous are prominence, placement, presentation (i.e., it uses terms and a
format that are easy for consumers to understand, and that do not contradict other statements
made), and proximity to a claim that it explains or qualifies.
Id. (quoting FTC letter to search engine companies).
59 See Mylene Mangalindan, Playing the Search-Engine Game , THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 16, 2003,
available at 2003 WLNR 13730254 (abstract only).
60 Id. (noting that these ads are readily identifiable from other search engine results).
61 Id. (describing various paid placement options for Internet search engines).
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search engines, “[e]verything is for sale . . . [a]s a consumer, I’m appalled; as an advertiser, I’m
delighted.”62
IV. Search Engines and Trademark Infringement
Anyone who has ever taken an Aspirin® for a headache or needed a Band-Aid® to bind up a cut
knows the importance of trademarks as descriptive terms.63  Trademarks are extremely useful as a proxy
for web users searching for particular content or sites.  For example, a person searching the web for
“TiVo” may also be interested in competing, but lesser known brands of digital video recorders.64  Given
the heavy reliance on descriptive terms that search engines need in order to properly function, it is
inevitable that web sites will attempt to employ trademarks, even other companys’ trademarks, as part of
the descriptive shorthand of Internet navigation.  Whether the use of these trademarks constitutes
infringement in cyberspace, just like in the real world, is highly dependent on the context.
A. “Bait & Switch” – Using Hidden Trademarks in Metadata to Manipulate Search Engine Results
The most obvious use of another’s trademarks occurs when the web site’s metatags (generally
keywords, title, or description tags) draw search engine users looking for a similar trademarked name to their
site.  While most major search engines have refined their search algorithms to minimize the ability of web site
owners to manipulate search engine placements in this manner, this practice remains commonplace in web site
                                                           
62 Stefanie Olsen, Search Sites Work to Clean Up Their Act, CNET NEWS.COM, August 19, 2002 (quoting Dana
Todd, founder of interactive agency Site Lab) at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-954171.html.
63 Aspirin® is a registered trademark of Bayer Health Care, Inc. and Band-Aid ® is a registered trademark of Johnson
and Johnson Company.
64 TiVo® is a registered trademark of TiVo, Inc.
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design.65  While the use of these trademarks is not obvious, or even visible to the average web site visitor, the
validity of trademark usage depends on whether it creates initial interest confusion to a website user.66
Whether or not trademark usage constitutes initial interest confusion is largely dependent on the
context of a site’s use of a protected trademark.  The most obvious case is when another’s trademark is
employed in a site’s metadata to act as the Internet equivalent of a “‘bait and switch,’ [which] is deceptive and
confusing as a matter of law.”67  This type of use was faced by the court in Movado Group, Inc. v. Matagorda
Ventures, Inc.,68 where the plaintiff accused the defendant of including Movado’s “Concord” trademark in
their site’s metadata in order to misdirect consumers seeking Concord watches to their website, even
though the defendant’s site did not sell Concord watches.69  Some courts have held this usage to be akin to
“posting a sign with another’s trademark in front of one’s store” with the intent of luring customers inside
                                                           
65 As some experts on web design have noted:
Previously, in the stone age of search engines (1998 or so), the keywords tag was a very important
part of a successful search engine optimization effort. Nowadays, its effect has been reduced by the
appearance [of] more sophisticated search engine algorithms. I'd still use this tag on my pages, but
I wouldn't fuss too much about it - a good META keywords tag can give you a small boost in many
engines, but its weight is minimal compared to other page elements.
A Promotion Guide, Meta Tags, at http://www.apromotionguide.com/metatag.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).
While not as critical to search engine placement, use of metadata keywords remains a common practice.  For
example, the web page www.personal-injury.com, a website for personal injury law, contains the registered
trademark “Vioxx®” both in the web page’s title (“Vioxx, Personal Injury, Car Accident Death & Brain Injury
Lawyers”) as well as the keywords “VIOXX,” “vioxx,” “vioxx heart,” and “vioxx recall” within the page’s
metadata.  See www.personal-injury.com (last visited Oct. 5, 2005).  For a discussion of how search engines have
changed to minimize a web site owner’s ability to manipulate search results by including desired keywords in their
metadata or titles, see supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
66 For a discussion of initial interest confusion and trademark law, see supra Section II.B text and accompanying
footnotes.
67 Movado Group, Inc. v. Matagorda Ventures, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18196, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2000).
One court summarized the problem as:
In the cyberspace context, the concern is that potential customers of one website will be diverted
and distracted to a competing website.  The harm is that the potential customer believes that the
competing website is associated with the website the customer was originally searching for and
will not resume searching for the original website.
Bitari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
68 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18196.
69 See id. at *15-16.  While the defendants tried to defend their use of the Concord trademark on the grounds that
“they assumed they would soon start selling Concord watches,” the Movado court felt that it “seems patent that the
only reason the Defendants would include on their website the brand name of a watch they did not sell [was] to lure
potential consumers searching the [I]nternet to their website.”  Id. at *16.
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under false pretenses resulting in trademark infringement.70  Even though it may be clear to a consumer
after visiting the defendant’s web site that the site does not offer Concord brand watches for sale, the
consumer was still directed to visit the web site because of the defendant’s misappropriation of the
plaintiff’s Concord trademark and goodwill.71
In jurisdictions that apply initial interest confusion, the use of another’s trademark in order to
manipulate search engines constitutes trademark infringement.72  A claim of initial interest confusion
requires a trademark owner to demonstrate a “likelihood that an appreciable number of ordinarily prudent
purchasers are likely to be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods in question.”73
Actionable confusion, under the initial interest confusion doctrine, is found “where potential consumers are
                                                           
70 Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999).  The Ninth
Circuit, in Brookfield, created the following analogy for such metatag usage:
Suppose West Coast’s competitor (let’s call it “Blockbuster”) puts up a billboard on a highway
reading – “West Coast Video: 2 miles ahead at Exit 7” – where West Coast is really located at Exit
8 but Blockbuster is located at Exit 7.  Customers looking for West Coast’s store will pull off at
Exit 7 and drive around looking for it.  Unable to locate West Coast, but seeing the Blockbuster
store right by the highway entrance, they may simply rent there.  Even consumers who prefer West
Coast may find it not worth the trouble to continue searching for West Coast since there is a
Blockbuster right there.  Customers are not confused in the narrow sense: they are fully aware that
they are purchasing from Blockbuster and they have no reason to believe that Blockbuster is
related to, or in any way sponsored by, West Coast.  Nevertheless, the fact that there is only initial
consumer confusion does not alter the fact that Blockbuster would be misappropriating West
Coast’s acquired goodwill.
Id. at 1064.  A similar situation, in the real world, was deemed to be trademark confusion in Blockbuster Entm’t
Group v. Laylco, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 505 (E.D. Mich. 1994), where the Court found that similarities between the
plaintiff video store’s “Blockbuster” trade name and the defendant’s video store “Video Busters” were sufficient to
constitute trademark infringement on the grounds that “Video Busters might attract some potential customers based
on the similarity to the Blockbuster name. . . . Because the names are so similar and the products sold so identical,
some unwitting customers might enter a Video Busters store thinking it is somehow connected to Blockbuster.”  Id.
at 513.  Furthermore, the Blockbuster court noted, “because it would be inconvenient to leave one video store to find
another, those customers lured into a Video Busters store may rent video cassettes from that store despite having
realized that it bears no connection to Blockbuster.”  Id. at 513 n.2.   Not all courts, however, have applied the initial
interest confusion doctrine to Internet cases.  See, e.g., BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d
185, 207-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (declining to apply initial interest confusion in context of Internet case).
71 Movado, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18196 at *16 (noting that defendant’s actions are “deceptive and confusing as a
matter of law”).
72 For a discussion of initial interest confusion, see supra Section II.B text and accompanying footnotes.  Not all
jurisdictions have recognized actionable trademark infringement where the initial interest confusion is dissipated
prior to actual sale.  See, e.g., Astra Pharm. Products, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1206-08
(1st Cir. 1983) (limiting actionable infringement to cases where decision to buy particular product is affected);
Teletech Customer Care Mgmt. (Cal.), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1410, 1414 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(finding “brief confusion is not cognizable under trademark law”).
73 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum, 818 F.2d 254, 256 (2d Cir. 1987).
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initially led to the non-owners’ allegedly infringing mark by virtue of similarity between the two marks—even
if such confusion does not exist at the time of the purchase.”74   
Given the context of the Internet and the legitimate expectations of consumers who use internet
search engines, it is easy to understand how this kind of use can constitute trademark infringement.  Web
users have come to expect that search engine results are reflective of a cataloged web site’s actual content.
Efforts to manipulate search engine results by use of another’s trademark, like in Movado, are clearly
designed to lure web searchers into a techonogical “bait and switch” at the expense of Movado’s potential
customers.  Even though web users can easily retreat from an infringing web site with a simple click of
their web browser’s back button, actionable trademark infringement under the initial interest confusion
doctrine has still occurred.
B. “Complaint.com”—Using Another’s Trademarks to Draw Search Engine Results and Web Surfer’s
Attention
Not all uses of another’s trademark intended to appear in search engine results are directed at
confusing web surfers.  Some uses are designed to inform people about trademarked items, even if this is
information that the trademark owner would rather not make available to the general public.  Popular uses
of this technique include using the trademarked name of a product in a web site’s metadata, titles, etc. in
order to draw users of that product into a class action suit against the manufacturer.  Another use is to
allow search engines to pick up “protest sites” that are designed to alert fellow consumers to problems
with a product, service, or an entire company that is identified by a trademarked name.75  While in both of
                                                           
74 Movado, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18196 at *13 (citing  Polymer Tech. Corp. v. Mimran, 37 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir.
1994)).  The Movado court noted three different varieties of “actionable confusion:”
(1) where prospective purchasers are led to believe that the trademark’s owner sponsors or otherwise
approves the second user’s use of the trademark; (2) where potential consumers are initially led to the
non-owners’ allegedly infringing mark by virtue of similarity between the two marks--even if such
confusion does not exist at the time of the purchase; and (3) where customers are confused as to the
source of the second users’ product even when observed post-sale.
Id.  The Movado court noted that the defendant’s actions violated the second variety of “actionable confusion.”  Id.
at 16.  Other courts have similarly found that this type of intentional misdirection constitutes a trademark violation.
See, e.g., Promatek Indust., Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 813-14 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding initial interest
confusion where defendant used plaintiff’s competing company’s name in website metatags); Niton Corporation v.
Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 102, 104-05 (D.Mass. 1998) (issuing injunction against
corporation using metatags to divert competitor’s customers).
75 For an example of a “protest site,” see www.paypalsucks.com--a website protesting Internet payment service
PayPal.   Paypalsucks.com, http://www.paypalsucks.com (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).  The site offers web forums,
links and FAQs designed to “expose the nightmare of doing business ‘the paypal way.’”  Id.  In addition to using the
PayPal name in the website’s uniform resource locator (URL), or name, the site also used the PayPal name in the
site’s metadata in the title, descriptions and keywords metadata which are picked up and factored into search results
of many major search engines.  Id.  The paypalsucks.com website ranked second in the search results from a recent
Google search for the term “paypal” and third in a Yahoo search for the same term.  Google.com, Search Results for
“Paypal,”  http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=paypal (last visited Oct. 6, 2005); Yahoo.com, Search Results
for “Paypal,” http://search. yahoo.com/search?p=paypal&fr=FP-tab-web-t&toggle=1&ei=UTF-8 (last visited Oct. 6,
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these cases the trademark owner would prefer to not have their trademark used by the web site, this type
of usage typically does not give rise to a cognizable trademark claim.
In Bihari v. Gross,76 the Southern District of New York evaluated a trademark claim against the
websites “designscam.com” and “manhattaninteriordesign.com” that contained the name “Bihari
Interiors” (the name of the plaintiff’s company) in both websites’ metatags.77  Both websites, were
dedicated to “the problems experienced when hiring a new [sic.] York City (Manhattan) designer” and to
discussing Marianne Bihari’s “fraud and deceit” in her interior decorating practices.78  The websites also
contained a disclaimer that the “site reflects only the view points and experiences of one Manhattan
couple that allegedly fell prey to Marianne Bihari & Bihari Interiors.”79
The plaintiff claimed that the use of the “Bihari Interiors” name in the metatags of the defendant’s
websites violated the Lanham Act because the use was likely to cause confusion to web users who may
express an initial interest in the defendant’s websites under the mistaken belief that they are sponsored by
Bihari Interiors.80  The Bihari court, however, declined to apply the initial interest confusion doctrine to
                                                                                                                                                                                             
2005).  For an example of a class action website, see www.yourlawyer.com--a website operated by the law firm of
Parker & Waichman that is designed to solicit clients who have suffered heart attacks or strokes while using the
prescription drug Vioxx® as well as users of other prescription drugs like Bextra® and Zyprexia® who have
suffered injuries.  Parker & Waichman, http://www.yourlawyer.com (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).  This site includes
the trademarked name Vioxx® in both the title and description metatags of the website.  Id.  The yourlawyer.com
website ranked seventh in the search engine results from a recent Google search for the term “Vioxx” and fourty-
fourth in the results listed from Yahoo for the same term.  Google.com, Search Results for “Vioxx,”
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&q=vioxx (last visited December 27, 2004); Yahoo.com, Search Results for
“Vioxx,” http://search.yahoo.com/ search?p=vioxx&ei=UTF-8&fr=FP-tab-web-t&fl=0&x=wrt (last visited
December 27, 2004).
76 119 F. Supp. 2d 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
77 Id. at 312 (describing nature of complaint).  The defendant originally operated two websites (with identical
content critical of Ms. Bihari’s interior design business) at “bihari.com” and “bihariinteriors.com” which were
relinquished under a preliminary injunction order.  Id.  “Bihari Interiors” was not a registered trademark with the US
Patent & Trademark Office.  Id. at 317.  The plaintiff sought protection of the name as a common-law service mark,
which is similarly protected under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.  Id.
78 Id. at 313. The plaintiff learned of the existence of these websites by using an Internet search engine to search for
the keywords “Bihari Interiors.”  Id.
79 Id. at 314.  The website also contained hyperlinks to other websites including “Tips on Picking a Designer,”
“Who’s Who in Interior Design,” and “New York City Information” as well as a “guestbook” where visitors could
leave messages for other visitors to the site.  Id. (noting negative guestbook comments disparaging plaintiff and her
company).
80 Id. at 318.  (“Plaintiffs argue that inclusion of ‘Bihari’ and ‘Bihari Interiors’ in the metatags of the Gross websites
is likely to cause confusion.”).  Although the Lanham Act, and its protections, applies only to commercial uses of
another party’s trademark, the Bihari court found the defendant’s usage to constitute commercial use.  Id.  Using
another’s trademark on the Internet is not per se commercial use and the websites in question did not propose any
commercial transaction to visitors.  Id.  (citing Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Farber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161,
1166 (C.D.Cal. 1998)).  The defendant’s websites did, however, contain links to sites that promote the services of
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trademarked names used in such “protest sites” because the defendant’s use of the Bihari Interiors name
in the websites’ metadata was not to “trick” Internet users into visiting their website, but rather a
legitimate means of cataloging the sites.81 Without the ability to use the Bihari Interiors name in the
metatags for their website, the court aptly noted that the defendant would have no efficient means of
getting their message out to the public.82  The defendant was not using the Bihari Interiors name to
confuse Internet users into believing that their sites were associated with Bihari’s company, but rather
legitimately using the plaintiff’s name and trademark in a descriptive sense.83
Given the nature of the Internet and the primacy of search engines in enabling web users to locate
data on the Internet, rulings like Bihari are consistent with the laws of trademark protection.  The use of
another’s trademark in metadata for a site designed to disseminate information, even unflattering
information, related to that trademark is not a use that is designed to mislead, but to inform web users
about a site’s content.  Courts must “balance the property interests of trademark owners with the
legitimate interests of Internet users and others who seek to make lawful uses of others’ marks, including
for purposes such as comparative advertising, comment, criticism, parody, news reporting, fair use, etc.”84
This type of use is not a bad faith attempt to misdirect web users to a website, but a critical and necessary
element in the way Internet search engines properly cataloge web sites--constituting permissible “fair
use” under current trademark law.85
                                                                                                                                                                                             
other interior designers and are designed to direct potential customers away from Bihari Interiors and to Bihari’s
competitors—justifying the Bihari court’s finding that the speech on these sites was commercial use and covered
under the Lanham Act.  Id.  (citing Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 308 (D.N.J. 1998)).  The Bihari
court noted that, while the Second Circuit has not expressly applied the initial interest confusion doctrine to an
Internet case, the Ninth Circuit has, as well as two other district courts within the Second Circuit.  Id. at 319 n.14.
(citing Brookfield Commc’ns v. W. Coast, 174 F.3d 1036, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1999), N.Y. State Soc’y of Certified
Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight
Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176, 190 (W.D.N.Y. 2000)).
81 Id. at 321.
82 Bihari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 323 (citing Bally, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1165) (noting “[a] broad rule prohibiting use of
‘Bihari Interiors’ in the metatags of websites not sponsored by Bihari would effectively foreclose all discourse and
comment about Bihari Interiors, including fair comment.”).
83 Id. at 322-24 (noting “the central considerations are whether the defendant has used the mark (1) in its descriptive
sense, and (2) in good faith”).  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. Inc. v. Bucci, No. 97 Civ. 0629, 1997
WL 133313 (S.D.N.Y. March 24, 1997).  In Bucci, the defendant made use of the plaintiff’s “Planned Parenthood”
trademark to direct visitors to their anti-abortion website, which claimed to be the Planned Parenthood homepage.
See id. at *1.  The defendant admitted that use of the plaintiff’s name to attract pro-abortion website visitors to his
anti-abortion website due to “misapprehension as to the site’s origin” in order to promote an anti-abortion book.  Id.
at *2, *4.  The court, in granting a preliminary injunction, found that the defendant’s use of the Planned Parenthood
name gave rise to a significant likelihood of confusion.  Id. at *10 (applying the Polaroid factors).
84 H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 10 (1999).
85 See Bihari, 119 F.Supp. 2d at 321 (noting the defendant’s “use of the ‘Bihari Interiors’ mark in the metatags is not
a bad-faith attempt to trick users into visiting his websites, but rather a means of cataloging those sites.”).  The
Lanham Act permits, as a defense, uses that are “descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the
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C. “Keying” Advertisements or Search Listings to Trademarked Names and Phrases
“Keying” online advertising to selected keywords, a relatively recent innovation employed by
search engines, is designed to help drive revenues while allowing parties to better target their message to
critical audiences.86  The Ninth Circuit described the practice as:
[A]llow[ing] advertisers to target individuals with certain interests by linking
advertisements to pre-identified terms. To take an innocuous example, a person who
searches for a term related to gardening may be a likely customer for a company selling
seeds. Thus, a seed company might pay to have its advertisement displayed when
searchers enter terms related to gardening. After paying a fee to defendants, that company
could have its advertisements appear on the page listing the search results for gardening-
related terms: the ad would be “keyed” to gardening-related terms. Advertisements
appearing on search result pages are called “banner ads” because they run along the top
or side of a page much like a banner.87
Advertisers can select any combination of terms to key their ads, including someone else’s
trademarked terms.  This practice may upset the legitimate trademark owner, but it may not constitute an
infringement.  Such uses clearly fall under the Lanham Act’s protections as commercial use of another’s
trademark.88  Because “[t]he ‘core element of trademark infringement,’ [is] the likelihood of confusion. . .
,” the determining factor is whether or not these targeted banner ads create the likelihood of confusion in
web surfers’ minds.89    Most sites take steps to distinguish these paid advertisements from other listings
in order to avoid the risks of confusion; however, these steps may not be enough to legitimize the
practice.90
                                                                                                                                                                                             
goods or services” or where the use of the mark “is functional.”  15 U.S.C.A. § 1115(b)(4), (8) (West 2002 & Supp.
2005).  In this type of application, the trademark use is both.
86 During the “early days” of search engine technology (1994-2000), the use of paid listings buried in search results
was “minimal to non-existent.”  Sullivan, supra note 58.  In 2000, the practice of using paid listings within search
engine listings achieved wider prevalence among Internet search engines.  Id.  (noting that “[b]y the end of 2001—in
the space of just a year—every major search engine had paid listings of some type prominently in its search
results.”)  See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
87 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1022-23.  Not all banner ads are keyed to specific terms—some advertisers pay to have their
ads randomly displayed.  Id. at 1023 n.1.  While these non-targeted ads cost less, they are also considered less
effective.  Id.
88 Id. at 1032 (finding “keying” based on a commercial trademark covered under the Lanham Act).  “Congress
intended to limit only commercial speech, as opposed to political or other more closely protected speech, when it
passed the dilution statute; thus, it included the requirement that the use be a commercial one . . . [I]t would be
difficult . . . in light of the clear evidence of the commercial nature of their enterprise [to find the use not covered
under the Lanham Act].”  Id.
89 Id. at 1024 (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1053 (9th Cir. 1999)).
90 In 2002, the Federal Trade Commission sent a letter to major search engine sites urging them to provide
conspicuous labels for commercial search listings or face possible regulatory action.  See Olsen, supra note 62.
Most search engines comply with this directive by choosing an explicit term for their commercial results that appear
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In Playboy v. Netscape Enterprises, Inc.,91 a classic case of keyword-driven advertising, the
defendants sold banner advertising on their Internet search pages keyed to certain keywords.92  For adult-
oriented advertisements, Netscape required the ads to be linked to a list of over 400 terms, including
“playboy” and “playmate,” which were trademarks owned by the plaintiff.93  As a result, whenever a
person typed in either “playboy” or “playmate” as a search term, these other companies’ adult banner ads
would appear on the search results page.94  The banner ads were “confusingly labeled or not labeled at
all” and would redirect a web searcher to the advertiser’s website when selected.95
Playboy brought suit claiming Netscape infringed upon and diluted Playboy trademarks.96
Playboy offered expert testimony which showed that a significant percentage of web surfers searching for
“playboy” or “playmate” would think Playboy sponsored the targeted adult-oriented banner ads appearing
on the search page.97  This confusion directly benefited the defendant, who would collect money from the
advertisers for each “click-thru,” even if they were driven by a confused web surfer.98  The Playboy court
reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings
                                                                                                                                                                                             
throughout their pages.  See id.  For example, Google sets paid listings out along the right hand side of their search
page under the title “Sponsored Links.”  See Google.com, http://www.google.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
Yahoo also sets out the paid listings at the top of the listing in a shaded box and along the right hand side under the
title “Sponsor Results.”  See Yahoo.com, http://www.yahoo.com (last visited Oct. 14, 2005).
91 354 F.3d 1020.
92 Id. at 1023.  A similar suit was brought by Estée Lauder against the operators of the Excite search engine for
selling terms corresponding to Estée Lauder’s trademarks so a competitor’s banner ads would appear at the top of
the search engine’s results when Estée Lauder’s trademarked terms were entered.  See Estée Lauder, Inc. v.
Fragrance Counter, Inc., 189 F.R.D 289. (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  Because the competitor was not associated with or
authorized to sell Estée Lauder products, Estée Lauder alleged trademark infringement.  Benjamin F. Sidbury,
Comparative Advertising on the Internet: Defining the Boundaries of Trademark Fair Use for Internet Metatags and
Trigger Ads, 3 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 35, 51-52 (2001).  This case, however, was settled when Excite agreed to stop
selling Estée Lauder’s trademark as keywords. Id.
93 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1023.  “The other terms are generally un-trademarked words associated with adult
entertainment, ranging from the expected (sex, parts of the human anatomy, etc.) to the disturbing (gangbangers).”
Id. at 1023 n.2.
94 Id.
95 Id. (“When a searcher [clicks on the ads], the search results page disappears, and the searcher finds him or herself
at the advertiser’s website.”).
96 Id.  Summary judgment in favor of defendants was granted by district court, but reversed on appeal.  Id.
97 Id. at 1026 (noting results of expert study concluding that user confusion stemmed from banner ad’s targeting).
The Playboy court noted that “[s]urveys are commonly introduced as probative evidence of actual confusion.”  Id. at
1026 n.28 (citing Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir. 1999)).
98 Id. at 1029 (noting defendants benefit from click-through whether driven by web surfer’s confusion or not).
Because the plaintiffs showed a significant chance of web surfer confusion, the Playboy court denied the defendant’s
summary judgment claim that their use was fair use.  See id. (“A fair use may not be a confusing use.”).
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because Netscape’s use of Playboy’s trademarks left genuine issues of material fact regarding
infringement of Playboy’s trademarks.99
The crux of the problem with Netscape’s keyword targeting of Playboy’s trademarks in banner
ads was that Netscape appropriated the goodwill of Playboy’s trademarks by benefiting from the initial
interest confusion created when web searchers clicked on these banner ads thinking the ads were
sponsored by Playboy.100  The Playboy court, however, expressly noted that the critical issue was the
potential confusion created by the targeting of these adult-oriented advertisements.101  Therefore, had the
banner ads been “clearly identified its source or, even better, overtly compared [Playboy’s] products to
the sponsor’s own, no confusion would occur.”102
Today, major websites like Google, Yahoo and others clearly identify their “sponsored” links;103
however, even a clearly “sponsored” link can be misleading under certain circumstances.  For example, a
recent search on Google’s search engine for the terms “Cartier watch” turned up a number of sponsored
links.104  Most of these links were to Cartier watch retailers, or price comparison sites offering web price
comparisons on Cartier watches.105  Not all the sponsored links, however, offered the sought-after Cartier
watches.  One of the sponsored links directs web searchers to a website for Timepieces International, a
web-based jewelry retailer that offers watches for sale, but does not sell Cartier watches.106  Although the
link is clearly set off from the search engine results under the listing of “sponsored links” along the right-
                                                           
99 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1034 (finding “[g]enuine issues of material fact exist as to PEI’s trademark infringement and
dilution claims.”).
100 Id. at 1025 (finding initial interest confusion from targeting of banner advertisements).
101 Id. (“[I]nitial interest confusion impermissibly capitalizes on the goodwill associated with a mark and is therefore
actionable trademark infringement.”).
102 Id. at 1025 n.16.
103 For example, on Yahoo.com, the sponsored links are placed in a separately shaded area at the top of the search
results or along the right hand side of the results page marked “sponsored links.”  See generally Yahoo.com,
http://www.yahoo.com (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).  Sponsored sites are similarly set off on MSN’s search site under
the name “sponsored sites.”  See generally MSN.com, http://www.msn.com (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).  This is
largely the result of a 2002 letter from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) requesting search engine companies
provide conspicuous disclosure of sponsored links to avoid consumer confusion.  See Sullivan, supra note 58.  For a
discussion of the FTC letter to search engine companies, see supra note 57.
104 See Google.com, Search for “cartier watch,”
http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&lr=&safe=on&rls=SNY%2CSNY%3A200420%2CSNYC%3Aen&q=cartier
+watch (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
105 See id.  The “sponsored sites” included retail websites like Overstock.Com, Bacario.Com, and
JewlersWarehouse.Com, that offer Cartier watches for sale.  Id.  Other sponsored sites included web-based price
comparison sites like Shopping.Com, BizRate.com and Shopzilla.Com that offer price comparison services for
Cartier watches across Internet retailers.  Id.
106 See Timepieces International Home Page, http://www.timepiecesusa.com/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
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hand side of the webpage 107 in accordance with the Playboy court’s requirements of “clearly identif[ying]
the source” of the link,108 initial interest confusion may exist.
Given the nature of these sponsored links, such use of the Cartier trademark is likely to create a
case of initial interest confusion.  While the link is clearly marked as a “sponsored link,” a typical web
searcher would likely assume that retailers sponsoring the “Cartier” trademark do in fact sell Cartier
watches (or at least offer price comparisons or other information related to these watches).  This is a
misunderstanding that could only be resolved after a person visits the sponsored link and may lead to
exactly the type of actionable initial interest confusion specifically prohibited in the Movado case.
The Lanham Act requires a “likelihood of confusion,” among actual or potential purchasers.109
Even though these advertisements are marked as “sponsored” within the search engine results the
likelihood of confusion in the context of the search engine’s use of the trademarked term is not
necessarily removed.  If a web user sees a list of retailers linked to a trademarked term, as in the Cartier
example, their natural assumption would be that those retailers sell Cartier watches.  Creating a parallel
for this in the “real world,” it would be akin to a jewelry store placing a Cartier logo on their front
window to attract customers, without actually selling Cartier watches.  Like the “sponsored links,” the
consumer is probably fully aware that the association with the Cartier name is generated by the retailer,
but there are natural assumptions that flow from such a self-association.  This is sufficient, given the
circumstances, to create the requisite likelihood of confusion to create an actionable violation of the
Lanham Act.
One of the Lanham Act’s original purposes was “to secure to the business community the
advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to
those who have not.”110  Such “bait and switch tactics,” even if conducted through a search engine, are
undeniable efforts to leverage someone else’s trademark.  Diversion of a trademark’s good will, even
through the use of an intermediary such as a search engine, should be considered as actionable trademark
infringement.
                                                           
107 See Google.com, supra note 104.
108 See Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1025 n.16.
109 See Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(1)(b) (West Supp. 2005) (requiring a likelihood of confusion for
trademark violation).  The 1962 amendments to the Lanham Act specifically removed the term “purchasers” from
the Act.   Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 2, 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. (76 Stat. 769, 769) 896 (deleting word
“purchasers” from § 2(d) of Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)).  The amendments removed the term “purchasers”
because “the provision actually relates to potential purchasers as well as to actual purchasers.  The word purchasers
is eliminated as to avoid the possibility of misconstruction of the present language of the statute.”  S. REP. NO. 87-
2107 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2847.
110 See S. REP. NO. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1275 (noting one purpose of Lanham Act
is “to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion
from those who have created them to those who have not.”).
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V. Conclusion
A complex and confusing mixture of common law, statutes, customs, and voluntary standards
currently governs cyberspace.111  The Internet, however, is not a modern day “wild west” with no
governing law.112  While the hyper-technical nature of the Internet often adds unnecessary complexity to
cyber-law questions, “in the end, the laws which protect an individual's rights in the real world often work
with equal satisfaction in cyberspace.”113
Just as in the “real” world, trademark protection in cyberspace relies heavily on context.  What
may be perfectly acceptable in some circumstances might constitute trademark infringement in others.
Courts, practitioners, search engines, and web site designers need to focus on the unique context and
business models the Internet can create when determining what is, and is not, actionable infringement.
                                                           
111 See Daniel J. Caffarelli, Crossing Virtual Lines: Trespass on the Internet , 5 B.U. J. S CI. & T ECH. L.  6 para. 1
(1999) (noting confusion and uncertainty of Internet users when sorting out their rights in cyberspace).
112 See Mark Grossman, Miami Herald Technology Law Column, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 27, 2002 ("Forget th[e] Wild
West metaphor. It's a myth. Cyberspace doesn't exist outside the legal system.").
113 See Fritch, supra note 33, at 63.
